The Prime Minister requested the revocation of the suspension measure, arguing that it infringed upon immunity and the principle of separation of powers.

In its published decision, the Constitutional Court highlights that, with regard to the principle of separation of powers, the judges were divided into two opposing positions.

Some of the judges held the view that balancing the interest of criminal prosecution with the proper functioning of the government would require prior authorization from the Parliament as an equilibrium mechanism.

They argued that involving the Parliament would prevent the risk of one branch of government interfering with another and would ensure institutional oversight.

“We deem that the balance between the public interest in ensuring effective criminal prosecution and the exercise of judicial functions, on the one hand, and the interest in safeguarding the effective functioning of the executive branch, on the other, necessarily requires the intervention of Parliament through its prior authorization. This requirement does not derive from an expansion of immunities beyond the intent of the constitutional framers, but rather from the need to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the branches of government and to ensure that any interference with the composition and functioning of the executive (government) is carried out with the participation of the body that holds political responsibility for it,” states the reasoning of the Constitutional Court.
The opposing position emphasized that the Constitution specifically foresees authorization only for measures such as arrest or personal detention, and that suspension is not included within these provisions. According to the judges, the suspension is considered a measure directed at the individual, rather than the institution, and as such, it does not inherently infringe upon the separation or balance of powers. The judges concluded that the suspension of the minister does not require parliamentary authorization and is not encompassed by the constitutional guarantees of immunity.

According to the Court, this measure does not, in itself, infringe upon the competences of the executive branch, but is intended to protect the integrity of the criminal proceedings by temporarily suspending the exercise of duties for a period of up to three months.

Regarding minister’s immunity, the Constitutional Court’s decision emphasizes that ministerial immunity is not a personal privilege nor an absolute protection against criminal prosecution.

The Constitutional Court emphasized that ministerial immunity is not an absolute protection from criminal prosecution, but a limited functional guarantee to ensure the free and independent exercise of office. Ministers, like any individuals, remain subject to criminal responsibility and judicial jurisdiction if they commit a criminal act. This immunity cannot obstruct criminal prosecution or judicial authority beyond the exceptions explicitly outlined in the Constitution.

The Constitutional Court emphasizes that ministerial immunity is not a personal privilege but a functional guarantee to ensure the free and independent exercise of public office. While it protects ministers from political interference, it does not shield them from criminal prosecution. Ministers remain subject to criminal responsibility and must comply with criminal laws and sanctions if they commit a criminal act.

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